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INTRODUCTIONI

Feminist legal theorists can legitimately complain that most
mainstream work fails to take into account institutions of intimacy,
such as the family. Discussions that focus on the market, for example, typically treat the family as separate, governed by an independent
set of expectations and rules. The family may be viewed as a unit of
consumption, even as a unit of production, but it is analytically
detachable from the essential structure and functioning of the
Martha Albertson Fineman is the Dorothea S. Clarke Professor of Feminist
Jurisprudence at Cornell University Law School where she directs the Feminism and Legal
Theory Project. She graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in 1975.
1. This Article is based on a book in progress in which I argue that there is a compelling
need for us to reconsider the basic distribution of responsibility for dependency among societal
institutions, specifically the family, the state and the market. This Article sets forth my ideas
about dependency and suggests a mechanism for increasing public discussion about the vision
of society we are collectively creating in and outside of our political institutions.
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market.
Similarly, when theoretical focus is turned to the nature and
actions of the state, the family (if it is considered at all) is cast as a
separate autonomous institution. Of course, the state may explicitly
address the family as a site of regulation or policy, but in non-family
contexts, the extent of societal reliance on the family is un- or undertheorized. There is little recognition that policy discussions about
economic and social issues implicitly incorporate a certain image of
the family, assuming its structure and functioning.
Likewise, theorists who focus on the individual seem to deny the
family any potential relevance or theoretical significance in their
work. Jurisprudential constructions ofjustice or liberty, for example,
consider the individual as the relevant unit of analysis.2 The implications of the fact that individuals exist in family or relational contexts
are largely ignored. It is no surprise, therefore, that little attention
has been paid to how assumptions about the family affect the theories
expounded in regard to market and state or the nature of the
individual. Few theorists recognize just how reliant their particular
visions of the word-as 'Just," "efficient," "natural," or "empirically
based"-are on the consensus that the family is the institution
primarily responsible for dependency.
This reliance on what I have termed the "assumed family" distorts
analysis and policy. The assumed family is a specific ideological
construct with a particular population and a gendered form that
allows us to privatize individual dependency and pretend that it is not
a public problem. Furthermore, the gendered nature of this
assumed family is essential to the maintenance and continuance of
our foundational myths of individual independence, autonomy, and
self-sufficiency.' This assumed family also masks the dependency of
society and all its public institutions on the uncompensated and
unrecognized dependency work assigned to caretakers within the
private family.
In economic and other important public policy discussions, we
focus on the appropriate relationship between market and state, with
the family relegated to the "private" sphere. Discussions proceed as
though the policies that are designed to affect these institutions in
the public sphere have only few implications for the unexamined

2. See Randall P. Bezanson, Self-Reliance, 71 N.D. L. REV. 29, 30 (1995) (asserting that the
choice of exercising liberty rests only with the individual).
3. Expressed as ideals, these abstract characteristics are theoretically attainable by
individuals only because we assume that families exist and perform their functions-producing,
nurturing, and providing for their members.
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private family. Even more fundamental, the discussions fail to grasp
the fact that the actual (as contrasted with the assumed) family might
profoundly affect the possibilities of success and failure of policies
created for the market and the state.
II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONCEPTS

To point out the neglect of the family in legal and policy theory
differs from concluding that the family has been considered an
unimportant institution. In fact, the importance of the family is
asserted in its very segregation from other areas of human endeavor.
This separation is exemplified in the often repeated characterization
of family law as one of three separate pillars of civil society-the other
two being property and contract. 4 The division of the world (and
law) into "public" and "private" realms also manifests the dual
conceptualization of the family as both separate and as essential.5
Not only is the family perceived as occupying the private sphere, it
is also conceptualized as embodying values and norms that are very
different from the institutions occupying the public sphere,
particularly those of the market. Family relationships are cast as
different in function and form than relationships existing in the
public world. Families are altruistic institutions held together by
bonds of affection. Of course, any serious consideration of the family
reveals that it is a very public institution, assigned an essential public
role within society.6 The family is delegated primary responsibility for
dependency.
In this Article, I will bring into view the family, or more explicitly,
Policy
the dependency hidden within the assumed family.
development and social theory considerations should center on
assessing the appropriateness of the aspirations and expectations we
have for the family. This assessment is crucial to one of the most
4. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 479-81 (1988)
(discussing the reconceptualization of contract, property, and family law).
5. The characterization of the market in this public/private scheme is interesting. It is
cast as public vis-a-vis the family, but private vis-a-vis the state, seeming to gain the advantage of
each category. In this regard, it is interesting to note that when the comparison is of market
versus family, the "private" sphere of the family is subject to heavy public regulation, mostly
because it retains aspects of "status" and is not governed by contract. In contrast, the "public"
arena of the marketplace is governed by bodies of designated "private" law, such as contract.
These contrary characterizations have ideological nuances.
6. See Nancy F. Cott, Giving Characterto Our Whole Civil Polity: Marriageand the Public Order
in Late Nineteenth Century, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY 107 (L. K. Kerber, A. Kessler-

Harris & K.K. Sklar eds., 1995) (giving a historian's perspective on the family as an institution).
Professor Cott states that "one might go so far as to say the institution of marriage and the
modem state have been mutually constitutive ... one of the principal means that the state can
use to prove its existence ...is its authority over marriage." Id. at 109.

16

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 8:13

compelling problems facing society at the end of the Twentieth
Century-the increasing inequitable and unequal distribution of
societal resources and the corresponding poverty of women and
children.
Ill. COLLECrIVE RESPONSIBILITY

Perhaps the most important task for those concerned with the
welfare of poor mothers and their children, as well as other
vulnerable members of society, is the articulation of a theory of
collective responsibility for dependency. The idea of collective
responsibility must be developed as a claim of "right" or entitlement
to support and accommodation on the part of caretakers. It must be
grounded on an appreciation of the value of caretaking labor. A
further important concern is to ensure that any theory of collective
responsibility not concede the right of collective control over
individual intimate decisions, such as whether and when to
reproduce or how to form one's family."
The rhetorical and ideological rigidity with which contemporary
policy debates have been conducted makes the claim of collective
responsibility a particularly difficult task at the end of the Twentieth
Century. Core components of America's founding myths, such as the
sacredness of individual independence, autonomy, and selfsufficiency have been ossified, used as substitutes for analysis, and
eclipsed rather than illuminated debate.9
I do not reject these core concepts. I do, however, insist that we
have a responsibility to reexamine them in the context of our present
society and the needs and aspirations of people today. We must view
these ideals with the complexity they deserve, perhaps redefining
them in the process. A commitment to a process of ongoing
reexamination of core concepts recognizes that, even if we are
absolutely confident (which we are not) that we know the historical
meaning, the demands ofjustice, as well as perceptions of legitimacy,

7. I mean to expand this notion of value beyond the labor theory of value to consider as
labor things not previously considered as such. The value is measured in and by social policy,
not market indicators and demands accommodation, as well as monetary subsidy.

8. This last point is an important one, but this paper deals mostly with the articulation of
the claim for collective responsibility. In the larger work, I use the model of Social Security to
address how subsidy can be made without supervising the use of the subsidy by the recipients.
See MARTHA ALBERTSON FTNEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 161-64, 230-36 (1995) (arguing that dependency is an

inevitable part of life, and that we should offer financial support for caregivers).
9. In addition, when the subject under consideration is caretaking, it is necessary to

develop a rhetoric to counter the pervasiveness of market ideology that privileges the economic
and confines assessments of success, progress and worth largely in monetary terms.
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require that our implementation of foundational principles resonate
in the current realities of our lives.
Justice requires constant mediation between articulated historic
values and current realities. It is not found in abstract pronouncements. Our understanding of independence, autonomy, and selfsufficiency, therefore, should be evolving as societal knowledge,
realizations, aspirations and circumstances change. Unfortunately,
the political and governmental institutions that should be facilitating
and encouraging debate and reconsideration are currently partisan
and polarizing in the methods they use, and thus, are actually
impeding understanding and exploration.

IV. DEPENDENCYAND SOCIAL DEBT
Historic ideals of independence and self-sufficiency are
complementary themes in our political discourse.10
These
aspirational ideals are applied to individuals as well as to families.
Their dichotomous terms, dependence and subsidy, are also
complementary, viewed as occurring in tandem. Both dependence
and subsidy have been successfully used in a simplistic and divisive
manner by politicians, social conservatives, and advocates of small
government to control and limit contemporary policy discussions."'
Dependence is negatively compared with the desirable status of
independence-subsidy with the meritorious self-sufficiency.
Independence and self-sufficiency are set up as transcendent values,
attainable aspirations for all members of society.
Simplified
pejorative notions of dependence and subsidy are joined, and
condemnation or pity are considered appropriate responses for those
unable to live up to the ideals, particularly those who are dependent
and in need of subsidy.
In fact, dependency is assumed if an individual is the recipient of
certain governmental subsidies. Furthermore, the mere label of
dependency serves as an argument against governmental social
welfare transfers. Policy makers argue that the goal should be
independence, and favor the termination
of subsidy so the individual
2
can learn to be self-sufficient.1
10. Autonomy is related to both these core concepts, and therefore, attention to this ideal
will be a by-product of the more extended consideration of independence and self-sufficiency.
11. Liberal commentators have also used the terms in this way, falling into the dominant
conceptions. See generallyGWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END (1998).
12. But see generally Kathryn R. Lang, Fair Work Not "Workfare: Examining the Role of
Subsidized Jobs in Fulfilling States' Work Requirements Under the Personal Responsibility and Work
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 29 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 959, 972-76 (1998) (discussing possible factors

that may prohibit an individual from becoming self-sufficient and independent).
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It is puzzling, as well as paradoxical, that the term dependency has
such negative connotations. Its very existence prompts and justifies
mean spirited and ill-conceived political responses, such as the recent
welfare "reform." Far from being pathological, avoidable, and the
result of individual failings, dependency is a universal and inevitable
part of the human development. It is inherent in the human
condition.
All of us were dependent as children, and many of us will be
dependent as we age, become ill, or suffer disabilities. In this sense,
dependency is "inevitable" and not deserving of condemnation or
stigma. Note that the examples I have chosen to illustrate this category of inevitable dependency are biological or physical in nature.
Biological dependencies, however, do not exhaust the potential
range of situations of dependence. For example, in addition to
biological dependence, one may be psychologically or emotionally
dependent on others. In fact, these other forms of dependence may
even accompany the physiological or biological dependence, which I
have labeled inevitable. But economic, psychological, and emotional
dependency are not generally understood to be universally
experienced. As a result, assertions about their inevitability in each
individual's life would be controversial. It is the characteristic of
universality (which indisputably accompanies inevitable dependence)
that is central to my argument for societal or collective responsibility.
In other words, the realization that biological dependency is both
inevitable and universal is theoretically important. Upon this
foundational realization is built my claim for justice-the demand
that society value and accommodate the labor done by the caretakers
of inevitable dependants.
I argue that the caretaking work creates a collective or societal
debt. Each and every member of society is obligated by this debt,
Furthermore, this debt transcends individual circumstances. In other
words, we need not be elderly, ill, or children any longer to be held
individually responsible. Nor can we satisfy or discharge our collective responsibility within our individual, private families. Merely
being financially generous with our own mothers or duly supporting
our own wives will not suffice to satisfy our share of the societal debt
generally owed to all caretakers.
My argument that the caretaking debt is a collective one is based
on the fact that biological dependency is inherent to the human
condition, and therefore, of necessity of collective or societal
concern. Just as individual dependency needs must be met if an
individual is to survive, collective dependency needs must be met if a
society is to survive and perpetuate itself. The mandate that the state
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(collective society) respond to dependency, therefore, is not a matter
of altruism or empathy (which are individual responses often
resulting in charity), but one that is primary and essential because
such a response is fundamentally society-preserving.
If infants or ill persons are not cared for, nurtured, nourished, and
perhaps loved, they will perish. We can say, therefore, that they owe
an individual debt to their individual caretakers. But the obligation is
not theirs alone-nor is their obligation confined only to their own
caretakers. A sense of social justice demands a broader sense of
obligation. Without aggregate caretaking, there could be no society,
so we might say that it is caretaking labor that produces and
reproduces society. Caretaking labor provides the citizens, the
workers, the voters, the consumers, the students, and others who
populate society and its institutions. The uncompensated labor of
caretakers is an unrecognized subsidy, not only to the individuals who
directly receive it, but more significantly, to the entire society.
V.

INSTITUTIONS AND DEPENDENCY

Society preserving tasks, like dependency work, are commonly
delegated. The delegation is accomplished through the establishment and maintenance of societal institutions. For example, the
armed services are established to attend to the collective need for
national defense.
But delegation is not the same thing as
abandonment. The armed services are structured simultaneously as
both the responsibility of only some designated members (volunteers
or draftees) and of all members of society (taxpayers and voters).
This dual and complementary responsibility is consistent with our
deeply held beliefs about how rights and obligations are accrued and
imposed in a just society-collective obligations have both an
individual and a collective dimension. Certain members of society
may be recruited, volunteer, or even be drafted for service, but they
have a right to be compensated for their services from collective
resources. They also have a right to the necessary tools to perform
their assigned tasks and to guarantees that they will be protected by
rules and policies that facilitate their performance. Caretakers
should have the same right to have their society-preserving labor
supported and facilitated. Provision of the means for their task
should be considered the responsibility of the collective society.
Society has not, however, responded this way to caretaking. The
most common form of social accommodation for dependency has
been its assignment to the institution of the private family. Within
that family, dependency has been further delegated as the individual
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responsibility of the family equivalent of volunteer or draftee-the
person in the gendered role of mother (or grandmother or daughter
or daughter-in-law or wife or sister). But the resources necessary for
caretaking have not been considered to be the responsibility of the
collective society. Instead, each individual private family is ideally
and ideologically perceived as responsible for its own members and
their dependency. A need to call on collective resources, such as
welfare assistance, is considered a family as well as an individual
failure, deserving of condemnation and stigma.
VI. DERIVATiVE DEPENDENCY
The assignment of responsibility for the burdens of dependency to
the family in the first instance, and within the family to women,
operates in an unjust manner because this arrangement has
significant negative material consequences for the caretaker. This
obvious observation allows me to introduce an additional, but often
overlooked, form of dependency into the argument-"derivative
dependency." Derivative dependency arises on the part of the person
who assumes responsibility for the care of the inevitable dependent
person. I refer to this form of dependency as derivative to capture
the very simple point that those who care for others are themselves
dependent on resources in order to undertake that care. Caretakers
have a need for monetary or material resources. They also need
recourse to institutional supports and accommodation, a need for
structural arrangements that facilitate caretaking.
Currently, neither the economic nor the structural supports for
caretaking are adequate. Many caretakers and their dependents find
themselves impoverished or severely economically compromised.
Some of their economic problems stem from the fact that within
families, caretaking work is unpaid and not considered worthy of
social subsidies. 5 There are also, however, direct costs associated with
caretaking.
Caretaking labor interferes with the pursuit and
development of wage labor options. Caretaking labor saps energy
and efforts from investment in career or market activities, those
things that produce economic rewards.
There are foregone
opportunities and costs associated with caretaking, and even
caretakers who work in the paid labor force typically have more
tenuous ties to the public sphere because they must also
accommodate caretaking demands in the private. These costs are not
distributed among all beneficiaries of caretaking (institutional or
13. Caretaking can be provided by hired help, in which case it is underpaid. In this
section, I am focusing here on caretaking responsibilities within family roles.
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individual). Unjustly, the major economic and career costs associated
with caretaking are typically borne by the caretaker alone.
Further, most institutions in society remain relatively unresponsive
to innovations that would lessen the costs of caretaking. Caretaking
occurs in a larger context and caretakers often need accommodation
in order to fulffil multiple responsibilities. For example, many
caretakers also engage in market work.14 Far from structurally
accommodating or facilitating caretaking, however, workplaces
operate in modes incompatible with the idea that workers also have
obligations for dependency. Workplace expectations compete with
the demands of caretaking-we assume that workers are those
independent and autonomous individuals who are free to work long
and regimented hours.
In discussing the costs and impediments associated with
undertaking the tasks of caretaking, it is important to emphasize that,
unlike inevitable dependency, derivative dependency is not a
universal experience. In fact, many people in our society totally
escape the burdens and costs that arise from assuming a caretaking
role, perhaps even freed for other pursuits by the caretaking labor of
others. The status of derivative dependency is structured by and
through existing societal institutions, culturally and socially assigned
according to a script rooted in ideologies, particularly those of
capitalism and patriarchy. These scripts function at an unconscious
(and therefore, unexamined) level, and channel our beliefs and
feelings about what is considered natural and what are appropriate
institutional arrangements. When individuals act according to these
scripts, consistent with prevailing ideology and institutional
arrangements, we say they have chosen their path from the available
options. The construction of this notion of individual choice allows
us to avoid general responsibility for the inequity and justify the
maintenance of the status quo. 5 We ignore the fact that individual

14. SeeJulie Novkov, A Deconstraion of Motherhood and a Reconstruction of Parenthood,19
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANCE 155, 165-66 (1991) (discussing the roles of working mothers).
15. In particular, I have been struck by two quasi-economic responses to the point that
caretakers should be compensated. I refer to one as the "Porsche Preference." This argument
states that if someone prefers a child, this preference should not be treated differently than any
other choice (like the choice to own a Porsche). Society should not subsidize either
preference. I hope the society-preserving nature of children helps to distinguish that
preference from the whim of the auto fan. The other argument I label the "efficiency and
exploitation" model. This argument is really nothing more than the assertion that if women
allow themselves to be exploited as unpaid or underpaid caretakers, that is then the most
efficient resolution for the problem of caretaking and dependency and should not be
disturbed. Aside from the fact that this arrangement is not working and that it results in
massive poverty and other social ills, this type of argument also demonstrates how little
economics has to offer to considerations ofjustice.
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choice occurs within the constraints of social conditions. These
constraints include ideology, history, and tradition, all of which
funnel decisions into prescribed channels and often operate in a
practical and symbolic manner to limit options.'"
As it now stands in this society, derivative dependents are expected
to get both economic and structural resources within the family. The
market is unresponsive and uninvolved, and the state is perceived as a
last resort for financial resources, the refuge of the failed family. A
caretaker who must resort to governmental assistance may do so only
if she can demonstrate that she is needy in a highly stigmatized
process.
VII. SUBSIDY

In popular and political discourse, the idea of "subsidy" is viewed as
an equally negative companion to dependence, the opposite of the
ideal of self-sufficiency. But a subsidy is nothing more than the
process of allocating collective resources to some persons or
endeavors rather than other persons or endeavors because a social
judgment is made that they are in some way "entitled" or the subsidy
is justified. Entitiement to subsidy is asserted through a variety of
justifications, such as the status of the persons receiving the subsidy,
their past contributions to the social good, or their needs. Often,
subsidy is justified because of the position the subsidized persons
hold or the potential value of the endeavor they have undertaken to
the larger society.
Typically, subsidy is thought of as the provision of monetary or
economic assistance. But subsidy can also be delivered through the
organization of social structures and norms that create and enforce
expectations. Taking this observation into account, along with the
earlier discussion of inevitable and derivative dependency, it seems
obvious that we must conclude that subsidy is also universal. We all
exist in context, in social and cultural institutions, such as families,
which facilitate, support and subsidize us and our endeavors.
In complex modern societies no one is self-sufficient, either
16. Using choice as justification for existing conditions also fails to recognize that quite
often, choice of one status or position carries with it consequences not anticipated or imagined
at the time of the initial decision. For example, we may say that a woman "chose" to become a
mother (societal and family imperatives aside), but does this choice mean she has also
consented to the societal conditions attendant to that role and the many ways in which that
status will negatively effect her economic prospects? Even if she did "consent" in that she knew
she was taking risks or foregoing opportunities, is the ultimate situation in which she finds
herself one which society can tolerate for some of its members? In other words, are some
conditions just too oppressive or unfair to be imposed by society even if an individual ostensibly
agrees to or chooses them?
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economically or socially. We all live subsidized lives. Sometimes the
benefits we receive are public and financial, such as in governmental
direct transfer programs to certain individuals like farmes or sugar
growers. 7 Public subsidies can also be indirect, such as the benefits
given in tax policy."' Private economic subsidy systems work in the
forms of foundations, religions and charities. 9 But a subsidy can also
be non-monetary, such as the subsidy provided by the
uncompensated labor of others in caring for us and our dependency
needs.
It seems clear that all of us receive one or the other or both types
of subsidy throughout our lives. The interesting question in our
subsidy shaped society, therefore, has to be why only some subsidies
are differentiated and stigmatized while others are hidden. In
substantial part, subsidies are hidden when they are not called
subsidy (or welfare, or the dole), but termed "investments,"
"incentives," or "earned" when they are supplied by government, and
called "gifts," "charity," or the product of familial "love" when they
are contributions of caretaking labor.
VIII. A MORE RESPONSIVE STATE
In order to rethink how we might constitute a just system for
handling dependency, our society must move beyond simplistic catch
words and engage in a nationwide debate. What types of mechanisms
can generate and sustain such a series of discussions? Shaped by the
successes of early feminist consciousness raising techniques, which
proved powerful in challenging entrenched ideas and assumptions
about gender roles, I advocate for a national consciousness raising
process. We need a forum for vigorous debate. The forum must not
only be public in the sense that it will be created and supported by
government, but also public in the sense that it will be participatory
and beyond governmental control, inclusive and not politically
partisan in composition.
It is important that the forum be a public responsibility (as
17. See Kenneth A. Cook, The Cash Cropper (visited July 11, 1999) <http://www.ewg.org/
pub/home/reports/Croppers/ChapterJ-.html> (calculating billions of dollars of Federal
payments made through the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) subsidy
programs, including farm programs, conservation programs, and disaster programs).
18. See Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-Time vs. Periodic, An Economic Analysis of the

Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAx L. REV. 305, 306-07 (1994) (discussing the elements of tax
subsidies).
19. In the book, I focus on the "coercive institutions" of state, family, and market. I term
these coercive because they are regulated and controlled by law. The voluntary institutions,
such as charity and religion, are not mandated to address dependency although they may
supply a supplemental set of resources.
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antiquated and quaint as that idea seems at this point in our national
history). In recent decades, it has become apparent that the role of
the state has been overtaken by the presumed inevitability of market
forces. As more and more is conceded to privatization, we are rapidly
losing any sense of public responsibility. Even public education is in
danger of falling victim to the privatizing siege. Missing from our
discourse is strong support for an active or responsive state of the
kind I am trying to imagine-the public as a mediating force against
private, obscured excesses, and exploitation.
Although it was less successful than it might have been, President
Clinton's initiative on race offers some ideas for how the government
might fulfill its public responsibility to generate discussion on
important national issues.
A Commission was created, made
responsible for developing, encouraging, and publicizing public
discussions on racial problems, as well as issuing a report on the "state
of the nation" in regard to race.2" While the report suggested some
on-going initiatives that might be helpful, one tremendous benefit of
the exercise was that it put people face to face in high school gyms
and public halls across the country and encouraged them to talk
about race.22
Reflecting on this process, I could not help but think that perhaps
welfare reform would have taken a very different form if the
President had employed the same mechanism in regard to the need
and direction for reform. I imagine that we could have generated a
series of thoughtful, factually informed, and depoliticized national
discussions about the nature and implications of dependency in all its
complexity to counter the inaccurate and ideologically driven
sloganeering that passed for political debate. We may have even
begun as a nation to realize that the real measure of any welfare
reform should be whether it positively improved the welfare of all our
children. We might have even reached a consensus that there is a
collective, as well as an individual, parental responsibility for
children. The point might have been made that, in today's world,
independence and self-sufficiency require a minimal amount of social

20. See generally One America: The President'sInitiative on Race, About the Initiative (visited July
11, 1999) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nitiatives/OneAmerica/overview.html> (discussing
President Clinton's vision of a national dialogue in which the community shares and celebrates
cultural differences).
21. See id. para. 4 (indicating President Clinton's intent to present a report to the American public based on results derived from the Initiative).
22. See One America: The President'sInitiative on Race, One America on the Move (visitedJuly 11,
1999) <http://iwv/whitehouse.gov/Initiatives/OneAmerica/movelO.html> (listing the Clinton Administration's efforts to establish national fora for addressing concerns relating to race).

20001

CRACKING THE FOUNDATIONAL MYTHs

resources (structural and monetary), and the amount required
increases when one has responsibility for the care of others.
Dependency on resources and/or on caretakers is not a unique
position in which to find oneself, it is a universal, and therefore,
unifying experience.
All of this might not have happened, of course. But at a minimum,
important questions that need to be resolved and discussed in a very
public forum would have been raised:
1) How should the need for caretaking resources be satisfied so
that caretakers can act independently, make decisions, and fulfill
societal expectations in ways that best respond to their individual
circumstances?
2) Should caretakers be primarily dependent on the family in this
regard?
3) Given the tenuous status of marriage in this society (where the
divorce rate hovers near fifty percent 23 and women are expected to be
wage earners, as well as wives and mothers) how can we continue to
have a traditional model of the family served up by politicians as the
solution for poverty?
4) Shouldn't the richest country in the history of the world have a
family policy that goes beyond marriage as the solution for
dependency?
5) Specifically, doesn't the family as it exists today require
substantial assistance from other societal institutions?
6) Is it fair that the market and the state (which are totally
dependent on caretaking labor and in no way self-sufficient or
independent from caretaking) escape responsibility for dependency
and continue to be freeloaders (or free riders) on the backs of
caretakers and families?
7) Isn't it time to redistribute some responsibility for dependency,
mandating that state and market bear their fair share of the burden?
As a result of such discussion, the very terms of independence and
self-sufficiency might well be redefined or re-imagined in the public
mind.
Independence is not the same as being unattached.
Independence from subsidy and support is not attainable, nor is it
desirable-we want and need the contexts that sustain us. A different
understanding of independence is needed and attainable.
Independence is gained when an individual has the basic resources
23. See generally Marriage,Divorce, and Remarriagein the 1990's, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P23-180 5 (1992) (reporting that younger people in the
United States who are marrying for the first time face roughly a 40-50% chance of divorcing in
their lifetime under current trends).
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that enable her or him to act consistent with the tasks and
expectations imposed by the society. This form of independence
should be every citizen's birthright, but independence in this sense
can only be achieved when individual choices are relatively
unconstrained by inequalities, particularly those inequalities that
arise from poverty. Independence, as well as justice, requires that
those who are assigned a vital societal function are also provided with
the wherewithal to do those tasks. This is a state or collective
responsibility and may not be relegated to potentially exploitative
private institutions.
IX. THE ACTIvE STATE
In order to move from our current situation to a more just
resolution for the dilemma of caretaking and dependency, we will
need more than a responsive state. The state will also have to be an
active participant in shaping and monitoring other societal
institutions.
One fundamental task will be monitoring and
preventing the exploitation and appropriation of the labor of some
citizens through institutional and ideological arrangements. This
must be prevented even when the justification for the labor's
appropriation and exploitation is that it is used for the good of the
majority. Further, it must be prevented even in contexts where social
constraints and conventions coerce consent from the laborer.
In this endeavor, the state must use its regulatory and redistributive
authority to ensure that those things that are not valued or are
undervalued in market or marriage are, nonetheless, publicly and
politically recognized as socially productive and given value.
Conferral of value requires the transfer of some economic resources
from the collective society to caretakers through the establishment of
mechanisms that tax those who receive the benefits of caretaking in
order to compensate those who do the caretaking. Other societies do
this in a variety of ways, such as using tax revenues to provide
childcare allowances and universal benefits that assist caretakers, or
through a basic income guarantee. 4 Money, however, is not
enough.25 The active state must also structure accommodation of the
24. One author has argued for a refundable Dependent Care Tax Credit (DCTC) that
would distribute average tax rate cuts to caregivers at all income levels. Anne L. Alstott, Tax
Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and InstitutionalChoices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2056-59

(1996).
25. I argue for an idealized re-imagination and an integration of the roles and
responsibilities of the family, market, and state for dependency. This re-imagination of family,
market, and state should begin with the basic premise that there are certain fundamental social
goods that are necessary for survival and for the caretaking of others. These social goods are
economic or financial in nature and include housing, health care, a basic income, and other
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needs of caretaking into society's institutions.
The fact is that today, some workers must shoulder the burdens
assigned to the family, while market institutions are relieved of such
responsibility (even free to punish workers who have trouble
combining market and domestic labor). The state must ensure that
market institutions positively respond to dependency burdens.
Workers cannot be assumed independent and unencumbered. Quite
often, they are dually responsible for economic and caretaking
activities. Restructuring workplaces to reflect that reality would more
equitably distribute the burdens for dependency, and forge a more
just relationship between family and market institutions.2
X.

CONCLUSION

I want to end with an epilogue-a dystopian fantasy in which I
imagine what changes would have to be made in order to really foster
our self-proclaimed national ideals of independence, autonomy, and
self-sufficiency. This exercise focuses not on the welfare mother, but
on the rest of us. I contend that if we seriously want a world in which
each individual is assumed to stand alone, to rise or fall on his or her
individual merit, and be beholden to no one for her or his success,
we must shape our policies so as to facilitate that model of society. As
it stands now, we give lip service to the ideals in a world where policy
and law protect and perpetuate existing and historic inequality, a
world where some individuals are subsidized and supported in their
"independence," while other individuals are left mired in poverty or
burdened by responsibilities not equitably shared.
For example, a society that truly sought independence as an ideal
necessities that complement and strengthen the dvil and political rights we have as citizens of a
democracy. The government has a crucial and undelegatable responsibility to secure that these
goods are delivered independent of the market value of any individual labor. This
responsibility marks a right of citizenship no less important and worthy of governmental
protection than civil and political rights, and can be realized in a variety of ways.
The governmental functions in this regard fall into two basic redistributive channels--some
income redistribution will be necessary to provide for basic social goods, and some
redistribution of responsibility will be necessary so that the market and its institutions respond
to dependency. The initial governmental task must be to ensure a more equitable distribution
of the wealth this society is producing, a recognition that the resources currently going to all
too few are really the product of a more widespread system of contribution. This financial
adjustment is necessary in recognition and satisfaction of the social debt to caretakers accrued
by all. The mechanism may be through such things as a restructuring of the tax and subsidy
systems, and crediting (and ultimately taxing) market institutions and actors on the imputed
benefits they receive from the uncompensated labor of others.
26. This restructuring can take multiple forms. A variety of proposals are necessary. For
example, flexible work weeks, job sharing without penalty, paid family leave, and the guarantee
of a living wage would contribute to a more sharing and equitable arrangement between the
market and the family.
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for individuals should institute a 100% inheritance tax. It seems
obvious that inherited wealth carries with it the potential to corrupt
individual initiative. Not only do we risk removing incentive with
inheritance, we also distort the meritocracy. People should not be
deprived of the opportunity to demonstrate their inherent merit and
worth because they are burdened by the wealth of their fathers.
Of course, inherited wealth is not the only distorting factor that
interferes with independence and the realization of a true
meritocracy. There are also existing and unequal economic and
social advantages, and it is unlikely that they will ever be totally
eradicated. I struggled with how to address this fact and concluded
that a lottery system is the most appropriate and just way to distribute
disparate social goods." The lottery would not eliminate differences
in social conditions, but advantages and disadvantages would be
distributed by chance. Although this might eventually ensure a much
more level playing field, I am willing, for purposes of this exercise, to
concede that social equality is not attainable. If that is so, and we
believe that each individual can demonstrate merit and ability
independent of the burdens presented by social and economic
contexts, we can at least democratize or randomize the process
whereby benefits and burdens are disbursed.
For example, if we wanted to put each individual to the test, we
might at birth assign each child a social security number along with a
list of the professions they might legitimately pursue, appropriately
grouped into categories, such as "service worker" or "professional."
We could also assign the schools they would be permitted to attend.
If an individual was not inclined to be satisfied with her or his lot
later in life, she or he would have to find a willing person with whom
to bargain or trade in order to alter the luck of the draw. To further
equalize contexts, perhaps each child should be compelled to spend
time in a number of different neighborhoods during childhood-two
or three years in Westchester County would be balanced by
equivalent time in Harlem, Alabama, Ohio, and California.
The point of this exercise is not to suggest seriously that this is what
anyone would want, but to point out that context does matter. We do
not begin our lives in equal circumstances but in unequal contexts.
Society's winners and losers become so, in large part, because of
benefits and privileges or disadvantages and burdens conferred by
family position and unequal distribution of social and economic
27. This is not the same thing as imagining a society from behind a "veil of ignorance."
One significant difference is that I suggest we mandate rotation into existing, known, and
socially accepted inequalities.
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goods. The approach to a resolution to this type of inequality is not
found in simplistic and hypocritical prescriptions, ideological
placebos of independence, autonomy, and self-sufficiency.

